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BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION OVER INDEPENDENT SUBSIDIARIES
OF A REORGANIZING CORPORATION
In re Beck Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1973)
Beck Industries, Inc. formed a wholly owned subsidiary (Subsidiary)
to acquire the assets of Webster Clothes, Inc. (Webster). The parties
used a hybrid Type A tax-free statutory merger" whereby Beck held all
Subsidiary stock, Webster stockholders received Beck stock from Sub-
sidiary, and Subsidiary acquired all of Webster's assets. Further, an
agreement among the three parties established the framework within
which Subsidiary could operate independently of Beck2 and provided
for delayed payment of a portion of the consideration." Beck and Sub-
1. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 368 provides:
(a) Reorganization.
(1) In general.
For purposes of parts I and II and this part, the term "reorganization"
means-
(A) a statutory merger or consolidation;
(2) Special rules relating to paragraph (1).
(D) Statutory merger using stock of controlling corporation.
The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange for stock of a
corporation (referred to in this subparagraph as "controlling
corporation") which is in control of the acquiring corporation,
of substantially all of the properties of another corporation which
in the transaction is merged into the acquiring corporation shall
not disqualify a transaction under paragraph (1) (A) if (i) such
transaction would have qualified under paragraph (1)(A) if the
merger had been into the controlling corporation, and (ii) no
stock of the acquiring corporation is used in the transaction.
"Tax-free" is not a completely descriptive term. It means present unrecognized gain
for participating stockholders, which can be a substantial bargaining factor in securing
stockholder acquiescence.
2. A Plan and Agreement (Plan), to which Beck, Subsidiary, and Webster were
all parties, detailed the structure of the merger. See In re Beck Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d
410 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973). See also notes 3-5 infra and ac-
companying text. The Plan, the Certificate of Incorporation, and the Articles and
Agreement of Merger (a document between Subsidiary and Webster substantially
similar to the Plan) established Subsidiary as an independent entity that was to have
its own assets, offices, and retail outlets. See note 23 infra. Beck covenanted to take
all steps necessary to maintain the existence and solvency of Subsidiary.
3. The Plan contained an adjustment of consideration provision based on stock
market values. See note 5 infra. The provision enabled Subsidiary to pay Webster
approximately $2.5 million of Beck stock on the date of the merger instead of the
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sidiary each agreed to indemnify Webster's shareholders 4 against any loss
in value of the consideration paid Webster due to a decrease in the value
of Beck stock. 5 Before Subsidiary completed payment to Webster, Beck
filed for Chapter X reorganization 6 and the value of Beck stock de-
clined.7 The Webster stockholders instituted a separate action against
$3.75 million asked by Webster for its assets. The Plan called for Subsidiary to defer
until December 31, 1971, payment of a sufficient number of additional shares of Beck
stock to Webster stockholders to equal $3.75 million on that date.
4. The indemnification agreement provided in part:
"Beck and Beck Subsidiary hereby agree to indemnify and hold harmless the
stockholders against and in respect of any and all damage, deficiency, loss,
claims, demands, actions, suits, proceedings, judgments and assessments . . .
resulting from any misrepresentations, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment
of any agreement, obligation or covenant to be performed by Beck or Beck
Subsidiary."
479 F.2d at 413 (court's emphasis omitted).
5. The delayed payment provision became crucial in the ensuing reorganization
of Beck. See notes 3 & 4 supra, 6 & 7 infra. The payment provisions read:
In the event that the Market Value . . . of the shares of Industries' [Beck]
Common Stock on December 31, 1971, is less than 150% of the Market
Value on May 6, 1969, then [Subsidiary] shall deliver additional shares of In-
dustries' Common Stock determined as follows: (i) the Market Value at
December 31, 1971, shall be deducted from 150% of the Market Value on
May 6, 1969 to determine the "Per Share Differential"; (ii) the Per Share Dif-
ferential shall be multiplied by the number of shares of Industries' Common
Stock delivered to the Stockholders on the Effective Date hereunder . . . to
determine the "Aggregate Differential"; (iii) the Aggregate Differential shall
be divided by the Market Value of Industries' Common Stock on December
31, 1971 and the quotient thereof shall be the number of shares of Industries'
Common Stock which shall be delivered under this sub-paragraph. The shares
to be delivered under this sub-paragraph, if any, shall be delivered on or
before January 15, 1972, ten days after the Market Value of such shares is
determined or (if applicable) three days after Industries' application to list
such shares, on a when issued basis, has been approved by the American
Stock Exchange, whichever occurs later.
Brief for Appellant, App. at 18-19, In re Beck Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.
1973).
6. Bankruptcy Act, ch. X, 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970). Chapter X proceed-
ings apply to corporations unable to meet current liabilities. Court-appointed trustees
attempt to formulate a plan to reorganize the corporation and prevent total insolvency.
See Heebe, Corporate Reorganization Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act 16
LOYOLA L. REV. 27 (1970). In Beck's case the district court granted the petition for
Chapter X reorganization in May 1971, some ten months prior to the 'date when
Subsidiary had to meet the adjustment of consideration pro Visions. See notes 3-5 supra.
7. Beck stock declined to 25 cents per share. Therefore, to fulfill the deferred
payment provisions, Subsidiary had to deliver to Webster over fourteen million addi-
tional shares of Beck stock. The Plan had provided that Beck would seek permission
from the American Stock Exchange to issue additional shares, if needed to fulfill pay-
ment to Webster, but the Exchange ceased trading in Beck stock prior to the settlement
date. With Beck undergoing reorganization, there was no method of securing these
additional shares, thus making delivery impossible.
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Subsidiary for rescission of the merger, return of Webster assets, and
damages. The bankruptcy court enjoined the Webster action. 8  The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held: Assets of a wholly
owned, independently operating subsidiary formed to acquire a third
corporation through a hybrid Type A tax-free statutory merger do not
constitute assets of the parent corporation for purposes of Chapter X
reorganization proceedings and are not within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court.9
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act gives the bankruptcy court juris-
diction over all property of the debtor, wherever located, 10 as well as
power to enjoin suits which affect the debtor's property." Since the
8. At the time of the approval of Beck's Chapter X petition, the district court
issued an order that all persons were
"enjoined and stayed from commencing or continuing an action at law or suit
or proceeding in equity against said debtor or said trustees in any court . . .
and from doing any act or thing whatsoever to interfere with the possession
or management by said debtor or said Trustees of the property and assets of
the within estate . . . or to interfere in any manner during the pendency of
this proceeding with the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court over said debtor
and said trustees and their respective properties."
479 F.2d at 413 n.6. In April 1972, the bankruptcy referee granted a motion of the
Beck trustees to restrain further proceedings in the Webster action, finding that it fell
within the district court order quoted above. The district court affirmed the referee's
order which found that Subsidiary was a separate entity by virtue of the sheerest fic-
tion and that it had served only as an instrumentality to facilitate the Beck merger
arrangements. In re Beck Indus., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The
bankruptcy court took jurisdiction over Subsidiary's assets. See notes 10-14 infra.
9. In re Beck Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858
(1973).
10. Bankruptcy Act § 111, 11 U.S.C. § 511 (1970) provides:
Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the court in
which a petition is filed shall, for the purposes of this chapter, have exclusive
jurisdiction of the debtor and its property, wherever located.
For a general discussion of Chapter X jurisdiction, see Heebe, supra note 6; O'Connell,
Jurisdiction, Supersession and Restraint in Bankruptcy, 44 RFn. J. 41 (1970); Seidman,
Chapter X or Chapter XI?, 76 CoM. L.J. 33 (1971).
11. Bankruptcy Act § 116, 11 U.S.C. § 516 (1970) provides:
Upon the approval of a petition, the judge may . . .
(4) . . . enjoin or stay until final decree the commencement or continua-
tion of a suit against the debtor or its trustee or any act or proceeding to en-
force a lien upon the property of the debtor.
See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.11 (14th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER];
Heebe, supra note 6; O'Connell, supra note 10.
For a consideration of what constitutes property within the bankruptcy court juris-
diction, see Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 448 (2d Cir. 1964); Green-
baum v. Lehrenkrauss Corp., 73 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1934); Central Republic Bank
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courts restrict jurisdiction to property over which a parent-debtor has
actual or constructive possession or title,:2 they do not consider the
assets of a solvent, independently functioning subsidiary as property
of the parent.1" Recently, however, a few courts have suggested the
need to enlarge bankruptcy court jurisdiction to deal effectively with
the economic realities of large conglomerate organizations.' 4
& Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721, 730-31 (8th Cir. 1932). The Bankruptcy Act
§ 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970), as applied to Chapter X proceedings in
11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 586 (1970), defines property as:
property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition
he [the debtor] could by any means have transferred or which might have been
levied upon and sold under judicial process against him or otherwise seized,
impounded or sequestered ....
For a discussion of the definition of property within the Bankruptcy Act, see 4A
COLLIER 70.15(2); 6A id. % 8.02 n.5.
12. The bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over property actually within the
possession of the debtor. Buildings, inventory, and real property of the debtor, as
well as the stock of a subsidiary, fall within this classification. Assets of a subsidiary,
however, are neither actually nor constructively within the possession of the debtor.
See Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1930); In re Adolf Gobel,
Inc., 80 F.2d 849, 852 (2d Cir. 1936); Liman v. Midland Bank Ltd., 309 F. Supp.
163, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., 24 F.2d
718, 719 (D. Del. 1928). Contra, In re Eilers Music House, 270 F. 915 (9th Cir.
1921). Questions concerning actual or constructive possession may arise when the
debtor has leased property from a third party. See Irving Trust Co. v. Fleming, 73
F.2d 423, 426 (4th Cir. 1934) (bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over leased property
although legal title remained with landlord). For instances of constructive possession,
see Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924); In re Weston, 68 F.2d
913 (2d Cir. 1934); In re Panitz & Co., 270 F. Supp. 448, 453 (D. Md. 1967).
13. See In re South Jersey Land Corp., 361 F.2d 610, 613 (3d Cir. 1966); In re
Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1936); Wilson v. Williams Hardware Co.,
32 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1929); In re Copper Canyon Mining Co., 156 F. Supp. 535,
537 (D. Del. 1957); 6 COLLIER 3.11; E. LATTY, SuBsmARIES AND AFFILATED COR-
PORATONs 42-46 (1936) [hereinafter cited as LAITTY]. Trustees acting through the
court could not enjoin a suit against an independent solvent subsidiary, but could exer-
cise the power of the parent as a stockholder and vote to sell all assets of that sub-
sidiary. Courts may not extend jurisdiction to an independent subsidiary's assets or
disputes simply because the outcome would substantially affect the debtor's assets.
See In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1936). See also Callaway v.
Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 142 (1949); Greenbaum v. Lehrenkrauss Corp., 73 F.2d 285,
286 (2d Cir. 1934).
14. See In re Central R.R., 469 F.2d 857, 869 (3d Cir. 1972) (dissent); In re
Westec Corp., 460 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.,
429 F.2d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 1970). In an earlier case concerning reorganization of a
city transportation system, the court found it necessary to expand jurisdiction to cover
independent interline companies. In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 731 (1946). More recently in a railroad reorganization pro-
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Whether a Chapter X court may disregard the separate status of a
subsidiary to take jurisdiction over its assets or disputes depends on the
xelationship between parent and subsidiary.' 5 The court may disregard
the separate entities of parent and subsidiary if they do not function
independently of one another'" or if treating them as distinct entities
would promote fraud, evade a statute, injure an innocent party,'1 or
lead to public inconvenience.' 8 To determine the independence of a
subsidiary, the court looks at the degree of control exerted by the parent
over the subsidiary.' 9 It may disregard form and scrutinize the sub-
ceeding, the court felt the'nature of the proceeding required that the bankruptcy court
retain jurisdiction over matters not normally within its jurisdiction. In re Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 446 F.2d 1109, 1113 (3d Cir. 1971).
15. See In re South Jersey Land Corp., 361 F.2d 610, 613 (3d Cir. 1966); Hamilton
Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F.2d 592, 594 (4th Cir. 1928).
16. See generally F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSMIARY COaRORA ONS (1931)
[hereinafter cited as POWELL]; Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity
.Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 128 (1917); Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate
Entity, 12 COLuM. L. REv. 496 (1912). For a discussion of subsidiary independence
as a factor in contract and tort liability of the parent, see Douglas & Shanks, Insulationfrom Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929); 48 B.U.L.
REv. 123 (1968); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1102 (1971).
17. Courts traditionally discuss fraud, evasion of a statute, and injury of an inno-
cent party without distinguishing them as independent factors. Often the courts deal
with subsidiaries which do not function independently of their parent, but, instead of
focusing on the lack of independence, they choose to emphasize fraud as the factor
which led to disregard of the separate entities of parent and subsidiary. See Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939); Maule Indus., Inc. v. Gerstel,
232 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1956); In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 F. 546 (2d Cir. 1905);
In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 F. 609 (S.D. Ohio 1907).
Courts have relied upon fraud and injury of an innocent party as reasons for disre-
garding the corporate entity, without dealing with questions of independence. See
Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635 (1942); Commerce
Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1935); United States v. Milwaukee
Refrig. Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905). See also 6 COLLIER 3.11;
LATIY 75-76; 46 HARv. L. REv. 823, 823 & n.4 (1933).
18. In In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 731(1946), the court took jurisdiction to reorganize a network of separate interline com-
panies in a citywide interlocking transportation system, although each company was
independent of the other. The court cited public convenience as the factor which
necessitated this expansion of jurisdiction. See note 14 supra. While cases such as
Beck increasingly contain rhetoric pointing toward public convenience and necessity,
particularly in relation to large-scale conglomerates, courts have resisted extensions of
bankruptcy jurisdiction to include independent subsidiaries where no factors such as
fraud are present.
19. Here the courts deal with parent corporations which, by definition, own at
least controlling stock in the subsidiary. In order to disregard the separate entities of
parent and subsidiary, courts require that the parent exercise more control than a
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stance of the relationship between parent and subsidiary when they
intermingle their functions, assets, funds, or personnel.20 In assess-
stockholder would in the normal function of a corporation. If the corporation exercises
its stockholder right to vote as established in the corporate by-laws and makes no
further attempt to direct the management and policy of the corporation, courts will not
find sufficient parent domination to disregard the separate entities of parent and sub-
sidiary. Courts require domination by the parent, such as operation of the subsidiary and
use of the subsidiary's assets. See 46 H4ARv. L. REv. 823 (1933); notes 13 supra, 20-24
infra.
20. Courts have ruled that ownership of all the stock or unity of officers or di-
rectors, or both, are insufficient reasons to disregard the separate entities of parent and
subsidiary. See Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 21 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1927);
Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co., Inc., 24 F.2d 718 (D. Del. 1928);
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 85, 155 N.E. 58, 58 (1926).
In Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940), the court enumerated ten factors
to consider in determining whether a subsidiary is independent or functions as an
"instrumentality" of its parent:
(1) Parent owns all or majority of capital stock of subsidiary.
(2) Parent and subsidiary have common directors or officers.
(3) Parent finances subsidiary.
(4) Parent subscribes to all capital stock of subsidiary or otherwise causes
its incorporation.
(5) Subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(6) Parent pays salaries or expenses or losses of subsidiary.
(7) Subsidiary has substantially no business except that with parent or no
assets except those conveyed to it by the parent.
(8) Parent refers to subsidiary as a department or division.
(9) Directors or officers of subsidiary do not act independently in interest
of subsidiary but take orders from parent.
(10) Formal legal requirements of subsidiary as a separate and independent
corporation are not observed.
In most instances in which a court has determined that the parent and subsidiary are
not independent entities, two or more of the following factors have been intermingled:
funds, functions, personnel, or assets. For a discussion of the instrumentality rule
encompassed by these ten factors, see POWELL 7-34. Powell also considers other
theories enunciated by the courts, but the use of any of these theories to disregard the
separate corporate entities implies that the parent and the subsidiary have operated as
one. See also Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir.
1963); Maule Indus., Inc. v. Gerstel, 232 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1956); Hamilton
Ridge Lumber Sales Corp. v. Wilson, 25 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Seatrade
Corp., 255 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966); Garrett v. Southern Ry., 173 F. Supp. 915
(E.D. Tenn. 1959); Woodbury v. Pickering Lumber Co., 10 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Mo.
1933); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
California courts use a formula involving unity of interest and ownership when the
separate personalities of corporation and owner no longer exist and when to treat the
acts (or obligations) of the parent (or subsidiary) alone would lead to an inequitable
result because the functions of the two entities are so intertwined. Automotriz Del
Golfo De California v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957).
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ing the independent status of a subsidiary, the court examines the on-
going operation of the two businesses rather than the parent-subsidiary
relationship at the time the subsidiary was created.2'
In Beck the court focused on the function of Subsidiary and noted
that, from the time of the merger, Subsidiary had operated independently
of Beck with its own assets, creditors, management, and bank accounts.
Subsidiary paid its own debts and held itself out to the public as a
separate and distinct business entity.22 The court concluded that Sub-
sidiary adequately met the criteria of an independent entity,23 and there-
21. Justice Cardozo expressed the problems of a court in formulating criteria to
determine independence of function.
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it. We say at times that the corporate en-
tity will be ignored when the parent corporation operates a business through a
subsidiary which is characterized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well
enough if the picturesqueness of the epithet does not lead us to forget that the
essential term to be defined is the act of operation. Dominion may be so
complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the
parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less
than th's, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice ....
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). For a dis-
cussion of the philosophical and practical problems of disregarding the corporate en-
tity, see LATrY 5-40.
In assessing matters such as adequate capitalization, courts consider whether a cor-
poration has sufficient capital to finance operations and bear the normal risks of business.
Thus, the court looks to the capitalization of the going concern rather than its initial
capital to determine whether capitalization is adequate. If the capitalization is inade-
quate, the court will then determine whether to pierce the veil between parent and
subsidiary's obligations. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6,
276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966); 48 B.U.L. Rnv. 123, 139 (1968).
22. 479 F.2d at 417.
23. The court noted a number of factors that served to make Subsidiary an in-
dependent business entity. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. The court found
that Beck's ownership of all of Subsidiary's stock and the presence of common directors
did not overcome the importance of the independent operation of Subsidiary's business.
Under the criteria of Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940), set out in
note 20 supra, the court's decision seems correct. There was no evidence of the type
of parent control that these criteria and the discussions of commentators envision.
The court of appeals in Beck looked to the ongoing operation of the subsidiary, an
approach similar to that set out in notes 20 & 21 supra. The district court, however,
had focused on the position of Subsidiary on the date of incorporation and merger,
rather than on the date of the reorganization. Since Webster sought to rescind the
merger agreement, the court had felt that it ought to look at the facts existing at that
time. On the basis of facts then existing, the district court had held that Subsidiary
came within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. While the question of rescission of
contracts often focuses on problems of mutual mistakes of fact at the time of formation,
bankruptcy law tends to focus on the time of petition. The courts adjudicate the rights
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Vol. 1974:498] BAINKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
fore the bankruptcy court could not assume jurisdiction over its assets
and disputes.24
The Beck case involves the interaction of corporate law, bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, and corporate merger techniques. It is the first
case to adjudicate the rights of parties to a hybrid Type A tax-free
statutory merger 25 in which one of the parties subsequently undergoes
of creditors and shareholders as they stand at the time of petition rather than on the
date on which the debtor incurred a particular obligation.
24. See notes 11-13 supra. For a contrary view under circumstances somewhat
similar to those found in Beck, see In re Beck Indus., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1369 (2d Cir.
1972) [Beck II], which involved another subsidiary of Beck. Beck H involved a
shareholder protest of another merger similar to the one between Subsidiary and
Webster. Apparently there was an executory contract for further payment for the
acquired corporation's assets but no separate indemnification agreement as in the
Webster plan. The suit was against both the subsidiary (Beck-Salz) and Beck, citing
misrepresentation of Beck's financial status at the time of merger. There the bank-
ruptcy court took jurisdiction, but the losing parties did not appeal the result. The
court made no findings as to this latter subsidiary's independence, and this might have
had a considerable bearing on the result.
25. For the statutory language see note 1 supra. The hybrid Type A tax-free
statutory merger allows the use of a Type A merger technique where there are three
parties to the merger-parent corporation, its subsidiary, and a corporation which the
parent wishes to acquire through its subsidiary. See B. Brr'KER & J. EuS'rCE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 14.15 (3d ed. 1971) [herein-
after cited as BIrrKER & EUSTICE]; Lowenstein, New Form of "A" Reorganization
Solves Many Corporate Acquisition Problems, 44 L.A. BAR BuLL. 111 (1969); Shors,
The Role of the Subsidiary in Corporate Reorganization, 18 DRAKE L. REV. 175
(1969). Prior to 1968, a Type A merger was restricted to two parties, the acquiring
and the acquired corporation. See BrrTKER & EUsTIcE f 14.12. Beck could not have
used Subsidiary to acquire Webster within the provisions of the Type A technique. See
Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937); Rev. Rul. 67-326, 1967-2 CuM. BULL.
143; BIrTKER & EusncE 14.12(2); Vesely, "A" Reorganizations--Statutory Mergers
and Consolidations, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 975 (1968). Only three of the six
forms of tax-free mergers may be used for an acquisition of an ongoing corporation.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1); BITrKER & EUsTICE ch. 14; Symposium:
Tax-Free Corporate Reorganizations, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 974 (1968). Of those
three, a Type A merger permits the acquiring corporation to use almost any form of
corporate security as consideration paid to the acquired corporation, while the other
two techniques require use of voting stock only. BITKER & EUSTICE 1 14.11(8),
14.12; Lowenstein, supra at 131; Vesely, supra at 976. Because it is a statutory
merger, however, a Type A merger must meet state statutory requirements for tax-free
mergers in addition to Internal Revenue Code provisions. Id. Since one such require-
ment is that both parties to the merger obtain the consent of a given percent of their
stockholders, permitting a parent to use its wholly owned subsidiary to acquire a third
corporation eliminates the problems and costs encountered in securing stockholder ap-
proval if the parent itself had to make the acquisition. See BrITER & EusncE
14.05(1); Lowenstein, supra at 112. Thus, the 1968 amendment allowing a wholly
505
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reorganization or bankruptcy. The court took no new position con-
cerning the limits of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction; subsidiaries
created to achieve a hybrid Type A tax-free statutory merger will be
treated no differently than any other subsidiary of a parent undergoing
reorganization.
In determining the limits of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, the Beck
court confined its consideration to factors relating to subsidiary inde-
pendence and did not deal with the complexity of the corporation
undergoing reorganization. The court's analysis of the independence
factors accurately reflects current jurisdiction theory as well as the
relationship of the two entities; Beck and Subsidiary carefully maintained
the formalities of independent corporations."8 But the court did not deal
with the competing interests reflected in the areas of the law involved
in the case: namely, problems of complex economic entities, the need
to preserve corporate formalities, and the purpose of Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act.
Corporations such as Beck regularly use merger and acquisition of
subsidiaries to increase the scope and complexity of their corporate ac-
tivity. The hybrid tax-free statutory merger involves three entities
as well as intricate financial and tax manipulations.27  As in the case
of Beck Industries, a complicated pyramid of interlocking subsidiaries
controlled by a single parent emerges. Recently one court has noted
that increased complexity of economic enterprise may require altera-
tion of traditional concepts of property, title, and separate entities in de-
termining the extent of bankruptcy jurisdiction.28  To assure smooth
functioning of the economic marketplace, courts need to adhere to the
formalities of corporate structure to protect the creditors, contracts,
liabilities, assets, and ties of independent subsidiaries, regardless of the
complexity of the enterprise of which they are a part. But disregard-
ing the interrelationships in conglomerate enterprises, even where for-
malities of independence are maintained, may ignore reality and im-
pose an impossible task on the process of corporate reoganization. D
owned subsidiary to use its parent's stock to acquire a corporation enhanced the use-
fulness of the Type A merger by expanding it to include three-party agreements. For
the text of this amendment see note 1 supra.
26; See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
27. See BirrnnR & EuSTICE 14.01.
28. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 429 F.2d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 1970).
29. Chapter X jurisdiction is broader than that of regular bankruptcy proceedings.
Certain requirements for plenary proceedings found in the regular bankruptcy chapters
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The purpose of Chapter X is to facilitate the reorganization rather
than liquidation of a corporation unable to meet its current financial
obligations. 30 To formulate an adequate plan of reorganization, or even
to determine if such a plan is feasible, the trustee needs considerable
control over the "body" of the enterprise, not just the "head." Al-
though a successful suit by the Webster shareholders could reduce Sub-
sidiary, an integral part of the total conglomerate estate, to an empty
shell, the independence of Subsidiary precluded the bankruptcy court
from assuming jurisdiction. In attempting to formulate a compre-
hensive, coordinated, and realistic plan of reorganization, the lack of
jurisdiction over such matters might well prove crucial.31
Extending jurisdiction to encompass such suits would certainly require
adequate protection for the independent subsidiary and the parties who
have dealt with it as an independent entity. Nevertheless, summary
proceedings in the bankruptcy court employ many procedural safe-
guards, including notice, rules of evidence, and representation. The
pleadings, although termed petitions, resemble those in any court pro-
ceeding; but jury trials are unavailable except in involuntary petitions
adjudicating a party bankrupt, and the choice of forum does not rest
with the adverse party.32 The courts and the Congress need to weigh
are not applicable to Chapter X proceedings, and the Chapter X court has the power
to enjoin suits against the debtor. Bankruptcy Act § 102, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970). The
reluctance of courts to bring independent subsidiaries into the reorganization proceedings
probably rests more on notions of corporate law than on specific language within the
Bankruptcy Act. The language of Chapter X, particularly in the case of a wholly
owned subsidiary, would require little, if any, stretching to include the subsidiary as
property of the debtor and fully within the court's jurisdiction. See notes 10-13
supra.
30. Heebe, supra note 6.
31. Numerous suits in widespread forums are costly and time-consuming. Bank-
ruptcy courts can rearrange their calendars so as to facilitate early hearings on im-
portant matters, thus enabling the trustee to know the value of a reorganizing corpora-
tion's assets much more quickly. It is difficult to determine whether a parent is able
to reorganize when the value of its assets is unknown. The trustee cannot liquidate
a subsidiary and realize its full value if the subsidiary is involved in long-term litigation
which may leave it valueless. Nor can the trustee reorganize the various entities into
a more compact corporate form if several subsidiaries are involved in extensive litiga-
tion which may result in bankruptcy. Finally, the cost of litigations in diverse state
or federal courts can become prohibitive. The result can well be litigation rather than
reorganization.
32. Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1932),
briefly notes the difference between summary and plenary proceedings in bankruptcy.
The court in In re Schafer's Bakeries, 129 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Mich. 1955), expresses
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these competing factors to determine whether further expansion of
bankruptcy jurisdiction is needed in reorganizations involving com-
plex enterprises such as conglomerates.88 One court has recently noted
a tendency of judicial interpretation toward liberalization of bankruptcy
jurisdiction in order to meet changing economic and business condi-
tions. The proposed Bankruptcy Act now before Congress deals with
expanding summary jurisdiction powers of the bankruptcy court,8 5 and
the belief that a court can offer sufficient protection to the various parties in reorganiza-
tion proceedings. For a contrary view see Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v.
Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966). Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is It Too
Summary?, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 78 (1966), discusses adversary proceedings in a bank-
ruptcy court. He finds the use of the word summary unfortunate, since it evokes an
image of summary judgments resolved on pleadings and affidavits. An adversary pro-
ceeding in bankruptcy involves examination of witnesses, representation of all parties,
pleadings, and normal rules of evidence. The bankruptcy court is more flexible and
able to control its calendar to facilitate quicker determination of the issues, but con-
stitutional guarantees of due process and adequate notice apply. Treister's major
criticism of summary jurisdiction is the many roles of the referee. The referee handles
all administrative matters and also serves as judge in adversary matters. These various
roles give him access to normally inadmissible evidence which might influence his
judicial determinations. The proposed Bankruptcy Act currently before Congress ob-
viates these problems. Administrators will assume nonjudicial functions and bank-
ruptcy courts would have separate judges. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRuPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. II, at 15-65 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
33. As previously noted, the definition of property could accomodate the inclusion
of independent subsidiaries and their assets within bankruptcy court jurisdiction. See
notes 11 & 29 supra. What Congress or the courts must do is to relinquish adherence
to concepts of corporate law which see the assets of independent subsidiaries as the
property of the subsidiary rather than the parent. The assets of a corporation are not
the property of its stockholders according to traditional corporate law. This concept
is the basis of the corporate form. See notes 12 & 13 supra. Nonetheless, courts do,
under some circumstances, ignore the separate entities of two interrelated corporations
or look to the assets of a single shareholder to meet corporate obligations. See notes
15, 16, 19-21 supra. In the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, where the trustee can,
as stockholder, decide to liquidate the subsidiary, merge it with another, or make other
alterations in the subsidiary's form, it would require little disruption of traditional
concepts of corporate entity theory to bring the subsidiary's assets within the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction. Either Congress or the courts must weigh the value of combining
the administration of a total conglomerate enterprise within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court against the disruption, if any, of traditional corporate theory.
34. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 429 F.2d 671, 676-77 (3d Cir. 1970).
35. S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10,792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Section 2-201 of the proposed Act extends bankruptcy court jurisdiction to "all contro-
versies that arise out of a case commenced under this Act . . . ." It then enumerates
certain types of such controversies but explicitly states that the list is not exclusive. See
REPORT pt. II, at 30-31. The note to that section states that the provisions broadenjurisdiction presently granted to the bankruptcy court, id. at 32, and the provisions
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the Supreme Court recently promulgated new bankruptcy rules.3 6 But
the proposed Act does not reflect any consideration of the particular
problem outlined here.
The Beck court failed to recognize and discuss these competing
interests. It did not note the emerging tendency to enlarge jurisdiction.
Although the Beck trustees argued in their petition for certiorari that
reorganization of multi-tiered conglomerates requires expansion of
bankruptcy jurisdiction,3 7 the Supreme Court declined to grant certio-
rari. 8 The arguments supporting expansion are persuasive, particularly
if adequate protection can be offered to the involved parties; but if
expansion is to come, it appears that it will have to be through legis-
lative enactment.3 9
themselves are clearly broad enough to encompass the Beck case if the court defines
property to include assets of independent subsidiaries. The Act abandons concepts
tied to nonbankruptcy definitions of property, such as "transferability." Compare
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970), and note 11 supra, with
REPORT pt. II, at 147-52 (§ 4-601 of proposed Act and note thereto). Since the pro-
posed Act and the notes dealing with the concept of property indicate a desire to
develop a "bankruptcy" concept of property and broad jurisdictional powers, the ex-
tension of that jurisdiction to assets of independent subsidiaries would not seem
inappropriate. Supportive of such a change is the increased procedural protection aris-
ing from the division of administrative and judicial tasks in the proposed Act. See
note 32 supra.
36. R. BANKR. P., 411 U.S. 989 (1973). The following are of particular interest:
Part I, Petition and Proceedings Relating Thereto and to Adjudication, id. at 1003-20;
Part VH, Adversary Proceedings, id. at 1068-86; and Part IX, General Provisions, id.
at 1091-103.
37. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 14-18, Trustees of Beck Indus., Inc. v.
Feldman, 414 U.S. 858 (1973).
38. Trustees of Beck Indus., Inc. v. Feldman, 414 U.S. 858 (1973).
39. Even in the proposed Act and its commentary there is no discussion of the
need to expand jurisdiction in this manner. If the drafters did weigh the possibility
and discard it, there is no indication in the Report.
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